(Iran 2026 should be compared to Iraq 1991, not Iraq 2003)
Hemn Seyedi
President Trump sees the Democrats’ rise to power in 2008 as a consequence of the Republicans’ losses in the unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq beginning in 2001 and 2003. He is almost right; Dick Cheney, who was the US Vice President during these two wars, was considered in the public opinion as the most guilty of all, mostly because he was the architect of the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. However, on a deeper level, Dick Cheney should have been held accountable for an opposite policy of choosing Non-Intervention policies in 1991. It can even be said that if those positions had not been held, the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq wars would not have been necessary.
At that time, Dick Cheney was the Secretary of Defence when the US, leading a global coalition, was able to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. While the whole world was waiting for the fall of a dictator who had bombed his own people with chemical weapons and occupied a neighbouring country, the US gave up on overthrowing Saddam Hussein. This decision became even more tragic when the dictator of Baghdad immediately launched a massacre of the people in his country who had risen. George W. Bush, Sr., had twice called on them to rise! Saddam massacred 200,000 Iraqis in just a few weeks. Dick Cheney, as Secretary of Defence, defended George Bush’s policy in February 1992, saying: ” We are not going to get bogged down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.”
He even defended this same policy two years later in 1994 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w75ctsv2oPU). Yet, eight years later, this time as Vice President, Cheney himself championed the invasion of Iraq. But what followed in the next decade was an even greater catastrophe. Saddam remained in power and continued to kill his people and commit many other humanitarian crimes, while the Iraqi economy collapsed. An estimated 350,000 Iraqi children died from malnutrition and preventable diseases. The UN’s Oil-for-Food Programme became one of the world’s most notorious scandals.
Another consequence, the roots of al-Qaeda and modern Islamic terrorism run deep across the region—seeds sown long before they culminated in the tragedy of September 11. In the aftermath, Dick Cheney pushed for an invasion of Iraq, echoing a decision he had resisted in 1991. But this time, the mistake wasn’t the war itself—it was the timing.
Less than a year and a half into the Afghan campaign, the U.S. withdrew the bulk of its military and logistical resources to launch a new front in Iraq. The Taliban had been militarily defeated, yes—but Afghan civil society remained fragile, undeveloped. Concepts like political participation, press freedom, and democratic governance had not yet taken root. Women’s rights and minority protections were absent from both education and public life.
If the 1991 decision not to remove Saddam Hussein was a premature end to a war, the 2003 invasion to overthrow him was a premature beginning. Saddam was cornered. The U.S. could have waited until 2005 or 2006, until Afghanistan was stabilised. Instead, it was as if a surgeon left one patient on the operating table, chest still open, to begin another surgery on a different patient—without stitching the first wound, let alone ensuring recovery.
Today, Iran stands where Iraq did in 1991. If the Islamic regime is not overthrown now, it may have to be later—at far greater cost. Some might believe this war should not have begun at all. But if it does, it must not end without regime change. The current leadership is not even comparable to Saddam, who at least waited for a ceasefire before turning on his people in 1991. The Iranian regime began mass killings *before* any war commenced.
Had Bush Sr. and his Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney, finished what they started in 1991, perhaps Bush Jr. and Vice President Cheney would not have been forced into a second, far costlier war in 2003—one that drained lives, resources, and global trust for years to come. And perhaps, in that different timeline, Senator McCain would have become president in 2008, not Obama.
While the principle of non-incomplete intervention should stand as the central lesson of the two Iraq wars and the Afghanistan conflict, several critical sub-lessons must inform any future action regarding Iran to build confidence in strategic planning.
First: Target military capacity—not civilian infrastructure.
Iran’s ideology of regional destruction is sustained primarily by its military power, not its civil systems. The objective should be to dismantle its armed forces, missile networks, and command structures—much like the Allied dismantling of Nazi Germany’s war machine in World War II. Civilian infrastructure—power grids, hospitals, schools—must be spared. To ensure accountability, robust monitoring and verification mechanisms must be established, demonstrating that the goal is to eliminate aggression, not harm society.
Second: Expect a prolonged campaign, not a quick victory.
The belief that a powerful adversary can be defeated in weeks is dangerously naive. Iraq under Saddam in 1991 was far weaker than Iran today—yet it still took a 40-day air campaign, the loss of 70 aircraft, and over 100,000 sorties to neutralise its air defences. Iran, with its advanced missile systems, underground facilities, and vast network of regional proxies, will require a longer, more sustained effort. Strategic patience is the audience.
Third: This war is not about morality—but about preventing greater brutality.
The aim is not ideological liberation, but to halt the regime’s ongoing oppression of its people and end the existential threat to Israel—the regime’s declared goal of “wiping Israel off the map.” In this context, every civilian’s life must be protected. The United States must officially acknowledge and apologise for incidents like the mistaken strike on the Minab school on the first day of the conflict. Both the U.S. and Israel must commit—publicly and transparently—to minimising civilian harm and ensuring such errors are not repeated. This moral accountability is not a weakness; it is foundational to legitimacy in a future democratic Middle East.
Fourth, this operation should not be considered complete when the war ends; reconstruction must begin immediately afterwards. The world must learn from Afghanistan’s lessons. Taliban emerged again when the world ignored Afghanistan. While the *Responsibility to Protect* has become an established principle of global governance, it must now be matched by a *Responsibility to Rebuild*. Without this critical counterpart, we risk seeing the rise of a new Islamic regime—first in opposition, then in power. History offers two stark examples: post-WWI Germany, where neglect after defeat and the imposition of unfair conditions led to dire consequences, and the later, successful recovery enabled by international support following its defeat in 1945. The lesson is clear—reconstruction is not an afterthought. It’s essential to lasting peace.
And, most importantly, local partners must be reliable, capable, and truly committed.
1. Reliable: Public figures, celebrities, and populist politicians—no matter how vocal—should not be trusted as primary allies. Their motives may be performative rather than principled.
2. Capable: True partners must have deep roots in society, proven combat experience, and the ability to mobilise under pressure.
3. Willing to cooperate: The U.S. and Israel can only rely on those who genuinely believe in democratic transformation—not those who have enabled or profited from decades of Iranian suffering.
There is no “Venezuelan model” for Iran. The war is not a template to copy. Iran demands its own unique, homegrown path—one built on credible actors, not exiled dreamers or opportunistic elites.